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APS-143                                              NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-3504
________________
RICHARD BERNARDI,
                                                                                  Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-02745)
District Judge: Honorable John W. Bissell
__________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6  
 February 24, 2006
Before: SLOVITER, MCKEE AND FISHER, Circuit Judges
 
 (Filed:    March 21, 2006)
_________________
OPINION
_________________
PER CURIAM
In March 1996, a jury convicted appellant, Richard Bernardi, of conspiracy to
commit bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2).  Bernardi was sentenced to a 33-
month term of imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release. 
Bernardi was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $164,512.00 and a fine of
$25,000.  Bernardi’s direct appeal was dismissed because he absconded while on bail. 
See C.A. No. 96-5712.  In October 1996, he filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
2claiming that counsel rendered ineffective assistance during trial.  The original District
Court Judge granted Bernardi’s recusal motion, the case was reassigned and an
evidentiary hearing was held.  Bernardi’s § 2255 motion was ultimately denied after the
District Court concluded that no prejudice resulted from counsel’s actions.  Bernardi did
not appeal that denial.
In November 2000, Bernardi filed a counseled motion seeking permission to file a
“second or successive” § 2255 motion.  Bernardi argued that the District Court punished
him for crimes of which he was acquitted and that he was entitled to relief on the basis of
the Supreme Court’s decision Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  This Court
denied Bernardi’s motion in an order issued on December 19, 2000.  See C.A. No. 00-
3853.  Despite our order, Bernardi returned to the District Court that same month and
filed a second § 2255 motion.  The District Court transferred Bernardi’s motion to this
Court to be treated as an application to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. 
Bernardi claimed in his application that: 1)  the District Court Judge who sentenced him
was biased; 2) counsel at sentencing provided ineffective assistance; and 3) he had “new”
evidence that an ex parte conversation between his trial counsel and the District Court
Judge took place prior to his sentencing.  We again denied Bernardi’s application as
insufficient to satisfy the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255 ¶8(1) and
2244(b)(3)(C).  See C.A. No. 01-3424.
Undeterred, Bernardi thereafter filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
directly with this Court, wherein he reiterated his claims that the District Court Judge was
biased at sentencing, that he was denied his “right to a new trial” due to an ex parte
3conversation the District Court Judge had with trial counsel prior to the § 2255 hearing,
and that counsel at the § 2255 hearing was ineffective.  In disposing of that petition, we
noted that while Bernardi’s petition was styled as one filed pursuant to § 2241, it plainly
raised claims that must be presented in a motion filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
Accordingly, we treated the petition as an application to file a second or successive §
2255 motion, but denied it as such as Bernardi did not present any claims that relied upon
“a new rule of constitutional law” or “a factual predicate that could not have been
previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”  See C.A. No. 01-8046. 
Bernardi filed yet another application – his fourth –  to file a second or successive § 2255
motion in February 2004, once again alleging ineffective assistance of counsel as a result
of his attorney’s ex parte communications with the District Court Judge and recently
discovered “new evidence” pertaining to this conduct.  Once again, we denied the
application.  See C.A. No. 04-1484.
Having been unsuccessful in his attempts to file a second or successive § 2255
motion, Bernardi returned to the District Court in May of 2005 and filed a petition for a
writ of error coram nobis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651.  In that petition, Bernardi repeats
his previous claims that he “has been deprived of fundamental and substantial
constitutional rights, including his Due Process rights to a fair jury trial, a fair and
impartial trial and sentencing, an unbiased and impartial sentencing judge and his
constitutional rights to the effective assistance of counsel throughout the trial, sentencing
and post-conviction proceedings.”  Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis at ¶ 14. 
Bernardi asserted that because he is no longer in custody within the meaning of § 2255
4and “was plainly entitled to the relief afforded by 28 U.S.C. § 2255 from his judgments of
conviction and sentencing,” relief in the form of a writ of error coram nobis “is
appropriate in this circumstance.”  Id. at ¶ 31.  The District Court noted, however, that a
writ of error coram nobis was an application predicated on alleged errors of fact, and went
on to conclude that Bernardi’s writ application was nothing more than a de facto motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Accordingly, given our past denials of Bernardi’s applications
for authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion and the failure of his
current filing to satisfy the criteria which might support such an application, the District
Court dismissed Bernardi’s petition.  This timely appeal followed.
The parties were notified by our Clerk that we might act summarily in affirming
the District Court’s order and were invited to submit responses.  Bernardi responded with
a brief arguing that the District Court’s order of dismissal should be summarily reversed,
the writ of error coram nobis granted and his judgments of conviction and sentence
vacated.  Bernardi further invites this Court to reconsider its prior orders denying his
applications for authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion.
We will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment under Third Circuit LAR
27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, because it clearly appears that no substantial question is presented
by this appeal.  The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, is a residual source of authority to
issue writs in exceptional circumstances.  Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. U.S.
Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985).  Moreover, a motion to vacate sentence pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is generally the exclusive means to challenge collaterally a federal
conviction or sentence.  Section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective so as to enable
5Bernardi to resort to the All Writs Act, specifically coram nobis, merely because he has
previously suffered an adverse decision in a § 2255 proceeding, has been unsuccessful in
his numerous endeavors to obtain authorization to file a second or successive § 2255
motion, and is now no longer in custody for purposes of § 2255.  See, e.g., United States
v. Baptiste, 223 F.3d 188, 189-90 (3d Cir. 2000) (per curiam).  As we stated quite some
time ago:
Use of the writ is appropriate to correct errors for which there was no
remedy available at the time of trial and where “sound reasons” exist for
failing to seek relief earlier.  United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512
(1954).  “Only where there are errors of fact of ‘the most fundamental kind,
that is, such as to render the proceeding itself irregular and invalid’, [sic]
can redress be had.”  United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 184 (3d
Cir.1963) (quoting United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69 (1914)).  The
error must go to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thus rendering the trial
itself invalid.
United States v. Stoneman, 870 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1989).  On the record presented,
we do not hesitate to concluded that Bernardi has fallen far short of making the necessary
showing of exceptional circumstances warranting coram nobis relief.
We will therefore summarily affirm the order of the District Court denying
Bernardi’s petition pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
